Dear Editor,

The establishment of the 51 District Development Councils was intended to serve one clear and common purpose: the administration, distribution, and accountability of the one million tala in public funds appropriated by parliament for district development.

Article 15 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law. Given that all District Development Councils share the same sole objective, they should be governed under a single, consistent governance model. However, the approach adopted by the FAST Government departs from this constitutional principle by applying different governance arrangements based on political affiliation.

Districts represented by FAST and HRPP Members of Parliament, as well as districts that did not apply under the programme, have been permitted to operate under a single-chair model. This applies to 40 districts that are effectively under FAST-aligned control. In contrast, the remaining 11 districts, those not won by the FAST Party in the 2025 elections, have been subjected to a compulsory co-chair model.

Under this compulsory arrangement, effective authority rests with Co-Chair A, a FAST appointee, who holds power superior to that of the sitting MP. As a result, MPs in these districts exercise no real control over district decision-making. This uneven application of governance structures amounts to the use of public funds to entrench political influence rather than to advance equitable development.

This discrimination is further highlighted by the Government’s co-chairmanship directive, which was introduced after applicants had already been interviewed for chairperson roles. Changing the rules mid-process undermines transparency, fairness and basic standards of good governance.

The Government promotes the co-chair model as fostering inclusive leadership, balanced decision-making, and clear accountability. Yet Clause 5 of the Financial Controls places effective control in the hands of Co-Chair A, clearly intended to be the FAST appointee. Rather than genuine power-sharing, this structure appears to be little more than window dressing designed to preserve centralised political control.

Clause 6, which governs council membership, further exposes this imbalance. Councils of 15 members operate on a 7–8 split, while councils of 20 members operate on a 9–11 split, determined by the allocation of appointments between Co-Chair A and Co-Chair B. In every case, the numerical advantage favours the FAST-aligned co-chair. These positions are funded by Parliament, yet there are no clear legal criteria governing the skills, experience, or integrity required of appointees. Alarmingly, some appointments have reportedly been made of individuals previously deemed corrupt by the courts, raising serious concerns about standards and accountability. In effect, the programme has become a job-creation scheme for unsuccessful FAST election candidates.

The programme also fails to provide for meaningful input from the Alii and Faipule or from village communities themselves in determining who represents them on District Councils. Instead, representatives are effectively selected for communities, rather than chosen with their participation or consent.

Although District Councils are legally recognised entities that should have authority to govern their own affairs, Clause 4(3) strips them of this autonomy by requiring unresolved matters to be referred to the PMU and the District Development Council Steering Committee. In practice, this results in decisions being dictated from the centre, despite the existence of clear voting majorities within councils.

The outcome is a bloated administrative structure that increases costs to provide positions for political supporters, leaving less funding available for actual constituency development. Public funds intended to uplift districts are instead being diverted to maintain political control.

If the District Development Programme is genuinely about fairness, development, and empowerment, it must respect constitutional equality, uphold transparent and lawful processes, and ensure that public funds are used for the benefit of communities—not for political advantage.

SUP Party